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Abstract 
Cross-examination particularly in the context of criminal trial is a human right 
recognized in international human rights law and the Ethiopian constitution. 
However, states are increasingly facing another pressing policy consideration – 
protecting prosecution witnesses who could otherwise be subject to intimidation, 
and who could even risk their lives for providing evidence in the administration of 
criminal justice. Witness protection has become an important public interest that 
justifies the restriction of the right to cross-examination. Without such protection, 
witnesses could be uncooperative for fear of reprisal and, in view of this, many 
countries (including Ethiopia) have introduced measures restricting face-to-face 
examination through, among others, the suppression of witness identity. A review 
of foreign academic literature and foreign case law reveals that, when considering 
demands for anonymity, courts exercise maximum caution to ensure that the right 
to cross-examine witnesses is not unduly infringed. The writer argues that a recent 
constitutional ruling by the Council of Constitutional Inquiry in favor of 
withholding the identity of prosecution witnesses has failed to properly balance 
between the right to cross-examine against protecting witnesses. The ruling is 
likely to have a negative effect on fair trial and can adversely affect the 
fundamental rights of accused persons in Ethiopia    
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Introduction 
This article seeks to explore the tension between the right of accused persons to 
examine state witnesses face-to-face and the need for protectin the safety of 
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witnesses. In doing so, the study focuses on examining the validity of the 
recommendation by the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (hereinafter CCI) that 
upheld the withdrawal of witness identity in a criminal case. The ruling was 
made following a petition contesting the validity of the anti-terrorism and the 
witness protection proclamations by MehadiAley and others who were charged 
with terror-related crimes. The ruling has a direct impact on –if not complete 
deprivation of – the right of the accused to cross-examine. With a view to draw 
lessons from other jurisdictions and Ethiopia‘s tradition, the writer has reviewed 
the experience of other countries. The choice of foreign jurisdictions is, 
however, based on availability of source materials.  
Cross-examination is key to a fair court trial process. It provides an 
opportunity to challenge the trustworthiness of a witness and expose lies and 
contradictions in the oral account by a witness. The demeanor of the witness, the 
manner of giving her testimony, her physical and emotional reaction to 
questions in cross-examination may hold the key to ascertaining the veracity of 
the testimony. The significance of confrontation for the defense is, therefore, 
very critical. In view of this, the Constitution of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia and  the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) embody the right of the accused to cross-examine witnesses. 
However, guaranteeing the well-being of those who give evidence essential 
to establish a criminal act is (and should be) an equally important public policy. 
If the witness refuses to come forward and give evidence for fear of revenge by 
the accused and his associates, that would have a chilling effect on the criminal 
justice system. Accordingly, many states, including Ethiopia, have enacted laws 
providing for the protection of witnesses. The Ethiopian proclamations on 
witness protection and terrorism authorize the suppression of information about 
witness identity and admissibility of hearsay and intelligence reports as evidence 
in court, thus, restricting the right to confront and examine one‘s accusers.  
Cross-examination is said to be ―basic to any civilized notion of a fair trial‖, 
―of paramount importance to the rights of the defense and the fairness of the 
trial‖1 and ―the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth‖.2  
Cross-examination is one aspect of the right to a fair and public trial guaranteed 
in international human rights law3 and under the Ethiopian constitution.4 Art 
                                           
1
 Footnotes omitted. David Lusty (2002), ―Anonymous Accusers: An Historical and 
Comparative Analysis of Secret Witnesses in Criminal Trial‖, Sydney Law Review, vol. 24 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/SydLawRw/2002/17.pdf > accessed 23 September 
2017, pp. 361-362. 
2
 Footnotes omitted. Ibid. 
3
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Art 10; International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966), Art 14(5). 
4
 Constitution of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1995), Art 20(4).  
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14(5) of the ICCPR, which is considered as an integral part of the Ethiopian 
legal regime5, guarantees the right of the accused ―to examine, or have 
examined, the witnesses against him‖.  
In Mattox v. United States, the US supreme court gave convincing reasons 
for face-to-face examination: to ensure that witnesses would testify under oath 
and understand the serious nature of the trial process; to allow the accused to 
cross-examine witnesses who testify against him; and to assess the credibility of 
a witness by observing that witness‘ behavior.6 The appearance of the witness in 
the courtroom enables the judge and the accused observe his/her reactions while 
being questioned and this may be crucial to assess the credibility and 
trustworthiness of the evidence.7 
On the other hand, as various foreign case laws indicate, witness safety is a 
valid ground to restrict the confrontation rule without which obtaining 
testimonial evidence would be a daunting task. The lack of protection to the 
witness, her family or property could render the criminal justice system 
impotent.8 In light of this, governments are taking steps for increased witness 
protection, especially in the face of rising organized crime and terror. In Britain, 
for example, many witnesses experienced one of ―the gravest‖9 intimidations in 
relation to the conflict in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s.  Thus, Lusty 
observes: 
The main obstacle to dealing effectively with terrorist crime in the regular 
courts of justice is intimidation by terrorist organizations of those persons 
who would be able to give evidence for the prosecution if they dared... The 
fear of revenge upon ‗informers‘ is omnipresent… It extends to all classes of 
society. It is not an idle or irrational fear. It is justified in fact by many well-
authenticated instances of intimidation, and not least by the example, familiar 
to all other potential witnesses, of a witness who was shot dead in his home 
in front of his infant child the day before he was due to give evidence on the 
prosecution of terrorists.10 
                                           
5
 Id, Art 9(4).  
6
 Witness protection during the prosecution and trial: Witness protection measures 
<https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/right-confront-witnesses-and-test-evidence> 
accessed 12 September 2017  
7
 Ibid.  
8
 Harris quoted in Nicholas Fyfe and Heather McKay (2000) ―Desperately Seeking Safety: 
Witnesses‘ Experiences of Intimidation, Protection and Relocation‖ in The British Journal 
of Criminology, vol. 40, no. 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 675-691 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/23638491> Accessed: 21-08-2017  
9
 Lusty, supra note 1, p. 385.  
10
 Ibid.   
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The first section of this article provides a historical account of cross-
examination and its restrictions focusing on its development in Europe and 
Ethiopia. The second section dwells on foreign laws and court decisions with a 
view to better understand the concept and the limitations necessitated by the 
need to protect evidence and the well-being of witnesses. The third and fourth 
sections respectively examine relevant Ethiopian laws the decision of from the 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry.  
1. Cross-Examination and Witness Anonymity in the Past 
In this section, we will examine the development and evolution of cross-
examination and its corollary, anonymity, in European and Ethiopian traditions. 
Although anonymity existed in both Europe and Ethiopia, there are differences 
in the way it was enforced. In the former, suppression of witness‘ identity was 
practiced in exceptional circumstances. Ethiopia‘s tradition is characterized by 
an open and confrontational litigation between the accuser and the accused, 
testimonial statements were given in secret, at least with regard to afersata, as 
we will see later. 
1.1 European historical account 
The practice of face-to-face confrontation in a court trial goes back to ancient 
times as the following account reveals:  
An early illustration of this right is provided in the biblical account of the 
trial of Paul (c 60 AD), who was accused of sedition as ‗a ringleader of the 
sect of the Nazarenes‘. Roman Governor of Judea, Festus, refused requests 
for the summary execution of Paul, declaring: ‗It is not the manner of the 
Romans to deliver any man up to die before the accused has met his accusers 
face to face, and has been given a chance to defend himself against the 
charges‘.11 
However, the cross-examination faced a setback in the Middle Ages after the 
administration of justice was criticized for being too lenient towards the 
accused. Then, the Catholic Church and European states introduced stringent 
procedures in the name of protecting the public interest.12 A system of 
inquisitional investigation and prosecution was introduced as a result of which 
any person could be charged based on a vague and unfounded allegation.13 
Governments legalized torture as a lawful technique of crime investigation. 
The church, on its part, employed inquisition to investigate offenses 
involving heresy and, with respect to this particular offense, it too, used torture 
                                           
11
 Id, p. 363. 
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and capital punishment. Restrictions on defense witnesses were strictly applied 
but those restrictions did not apply to state witnesses, hence, the double standard 
nature of the trial. As Lusty noted, ―All statements adverse to the accused 
‗[were] freely received, whether based on knowledge or prejudice, hearsay 
evidence, vague rumors, general impressions, or idle gossip‖. This approach was 
justified as proper in dealing with the then pressing issue of heresy in view of 
―the high risk of reprisals against those who testified against their neighbors‖14 
The English philosopher Bentham criticized the inquisition as a system whereby 
evidence was taken under a ‗veil of secrecy‘ and the door was left ‗wide open to 
mendacity, falsehood, and partiality‘‖.15 
Even then, witness anonymity was considered as an exception that applied 
only when a demonstrated risk to a witness existed and the matter was to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.16 Put another way, withholding of names 
and identities of witnesses was not a matter of principle but of exception. 
Ultimately, the inquisition was abolished in 1834 and the period of its 
application is described ―as among the darkest blots on the record of 
mankind.‖17 It is also viewed as an instrument of revenge for political and 
personal reasons that paved the way for ―perjury and malicious testimony‖.18 
At the beginning of the 20th century, face-to-face examination was 
considered as a valuable means to check the truthfulness of testimonies. In the 
end, the adversarial system emerged as a mechanism to counterbalance the 
weight of the testimony of the accuser and ensure the equality of arms in the 
legal battle.19  
1.2 Ethiopian Historical Account: Overview of Afersata and Leba Shay 
Ethiopia has a long history and over eighty ethno-linguistic communities. This 
section focuses on two traditional investigation schemes that were practiced in 
various parts of the country. Although customary law holds marginal place in 
the modern state law of Ethiopia, it is still the predominant mode of conflict 
resolution mechanism outside the state apparatus, including in criminal matters. 
                                           
14
 Id. Footnotes omitted. p. 366. 
15
 Witness protection during the prosecution, supra note 6. 
16
 Footnotes omitted. Lusty, supra note 1, p. 368. 
17
 Footnotes omitted. Ibid. 
18
 Footnotes omitted. Id, p. 369. 
19 The Harvard Law Record, Confrontation: Getting It 
Right<http://hlrecord.org/2015/09/confrontation-getting-it-right/> accessed 20 September 
2017 
308                              MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 12, No.2                             December 2018 
 
 
Staley Fisher noted that the multitude of ethnic communities had their own 
dispute settlement procedures operating parallel to the state structure.20  
Although the FDRE Constitution confines the power of customary courts to 
decide personal and family matters and only with the consent of the disputing 
parties,21 customary laws are indeed applied in various aspects of social conduct 
especially in the countryside. As Endalew Lijalem notes: 
In many regions of Ethiopia, the customary norms are stronger, more 
relevant, and accessible than imposed and top-down legal norms. Moreover, 
experiences in different regions of Ethiopia show that people, even after 
passing through the procedures and penalties in the formal criminal court, 
tend to use the customary dispute resolution mechanisms for reconciliation 
and in order to control acts of revenge.22 
Afersata and Leba Shay were the two most widely used traditional modes of 
crime investigation and prosecution.  Afersata (Afan Oromo) is probably the 
most widely used mode of crime investigation and prosecution. It is also known 
as awuchachign in (the former provinces of) Shewa and Wollo; ewuse, in 
Gojam.23 The operation of Aftersata is initiated by the injured party and, in case 
of serious offences by local officials, then the village leader would call a 
meeting of community for the inquiry. At the gathering, every individual would, 
turn by turn, communicate to the elderly the name of the person whom he 
suspects of committing the crime.24 
Fisher describes the procedure in detail. With regard to the technique of 
affersata and the incentive to name the offender, he states the following: 
The technique used was to summon all inhabitants of the neighborhood 
where the crime was committed, and to sequester them until they named the 
criminal. Failure to attend the affersata was sanctioned by an ―absence fine,‖ 
and the assembly‘s failure to name the criminal resulted in communal 
liability to repair the damage caused by the offense. The wish to avoid this 
liability, together with the serious hardship caused by sequestration of the 
                                           
20
 Stanley Z. Fisher (1971), ―Traditional Criminal Procedure in Ethiopia‖ in The American 
Journal of Comparative Law, vol. (American Association for the Comparative Study of 
Law), pp. 716-724.   
21
Constitution of Ethiopia, supra note 4, Art 34(5).  
22
 Endalew Lijalem (2014) Ethiopian Customary Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Forms of 
Restorative Justice? <http://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/%EF%BF%BCethiopian-
customary-dispute-resolution-mechanisms/> accessed 20 September 2017 
23
 Fisher, supra note 20, p. 716. Minor adjustments are made in the spelling of some words 
to make them consistent with the commonly used approach. For example ―iwus‖ in the 
original is written as ewus.  
24
 Aberra Jembere, An Introduction to the Legal History of Ethiopia: 1434-1974 (Shama 
Books, Addis Abeba, 2012), p. 239.  
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whole community (it was reportedly decreed: ―not a cow be milked nor a 
baby suckled‖ until the investigation was over), provided ample incentive to 
name the offender if that was possible.25 
Affersata was a collective community endeavor to find out a crime suspect 
and establish his guilt.  During this cumbersome process, participants could not 
go to their homes or attend their livestock and crops. The swearing in the name 
of God and Virgin Mary must have been a powerful psychological force to 
persuade the people to speak the truth.  One should also note that Ethiopians 
have been, at least in the past, God-fearing people with deep reverence to 
spiritual life.26 
Based on the reliability of the sources, testimonies were divided into three: 
(i) eye-witnesses, those who saw the commission of the crime firsthand; (ii) 
those who witnessed relevant facts and circumstances about the occurrence of a 
crime soon before or after its commission; and (iii) those who would testify 
based on hearsay.27 The latter were called wof (literally, bird). An appeal was 
possible against conviction passed based on the testimony of birds only. What is 
interesting is that the identity of witnesses was not known to the accused or the 
public; the elderly responsible to hear testimony kept their names confidential. 
As a result, the suspect had no opportunity to confront his accusers.28 That 
means the accused could not question the witnesses testifying against him/her. 
So, traditionally, Ethiopia allowed anonymous testimony.   
Afersata became unpopular because of the concomitant incontinence it 
caused to people who had to endure the sequestration for days, sometimes for 
weeks, away from their family, cattle and farms. The villagers had to also 
shoulder the burden of feeding local officials during the event. This is likely to 
encourage the people to make false accusations or false confessions.29 Witness 
anonymity sometimes led to false accusations. Thus, Fisher observed that ―some 
criminals and others reportedly took advantage of the anonymity of the ‗birds‘ 
to accuse innocent persons, perhaps personal enemies, who could never learn 
the identity of their accusers.‖30 Nonetheless, in the absence of trained 
professional detectives and prosecutors, it is likely to have served as deterrence 
                                           
25
 Footnotes omitted. Fisher, Traditional Criminal Procedure, supra note 20, p. 717.  
26
 As Blaten-Geta Mahteme-Selassie WoldeMeskel pointed out, Ethiopians attached great 
value to the virtues of justice, religion, patriotism and respect for social status. Blaten-
Geta Mahteme-Selassie quoted in Aberra, An Introduction, supra note 24, footnote 506, p. 
238. 
27
 Fisher, supra note 20, p. 719.  
28
 Aberra, supra note 24, p. 239.  
29
 Fisher, supra note 20.  
30
 Ibid. 
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for potential offenders. Owing to the problems related with Aftersata, a law was 
enacted during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie (the Afersata Proclamation 
enacted in 1933) to curb unintended consequences of the institution.   
The leba shay institution was another crime investigation technique among 
the inhabitants of the highland areas (including present-day Eritrea) and among 
the Oromo.31 The method was particularly applied to apprehend thieves and the 
fruit of their crime. Leba shay operated as follows. A young boy, before the age 
of puberty, is made to drink a beverage made of an intoxicating herb.32 Then the 
intoxicated boy is tied with a strip of cloth on his waist and the chief thief-
seeker follows him holding the other tip of the strip until the boy is said to have 
identified the criminal. Both Fisher and Aberra Jembere give similar accounts 
on functioning of the leba shay institution. The following excerpt is from the 
latter‘s book.  
… In the house where he [the boy] collapsed he would again be made to 
drink the beverage so that he could identify the particular individual from 
among the inhabitants of the house. The boy would push aside anyone he 
meets entering the house of the suspected culprit. Any person on whom he 
laid his hand would be taken as a suspect and brought before a court of law.33 
This practice was clearly irrational and superstitious. First, the boy‘s 
―sniffing out‖ of the accused was considered conclusive evidence to prove guilt. 
Second, the role of thief-seeker involved a conflict of interest in that the 
payment for his service came from the fine imposed on the convicted person, 
thus, the incentive to secure false accusation.34 Fisher has more on this, ―There 
are numerous reports of such abuses, extending even to accusations that the 
thief-seeker acted in cahoots with thieves, corruptly agreeing to provide 
―protection‖ by seeing that innocent parties were always ―tagged‖ by the boy.‖ 
Having regard to this, the government of the day took some reform measures to 
minimize abuses such as setting of a ceiling on the amount of fee and punishing 
those who falsely accused innocent people.35  
2.  Current Experience of Cross-Examination and Anonymity in 
Various Jurisdictions 
This section highlights the practice of some jurisdictions. It focuses on case law 
to see how foreign courts handle the conflict between witness protection 
measures and the face-to-face examination principle.  




 Ibid.   
33
Aberra, supra note 24, p.  238.  
34
 Fisher, supra note 20.  
35
 Footnotes omitted. Ibid. 
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Witness protection is not in principle available in the US ―even in situations 
where the defendant or her associates threaten the physical safety of the 
witness.‖36 The Constitution‘s confrontation clause does not have any 
limitations.37 The US Constitution guarantees ―the right to be confronted with 
witnesses against him.‖38 Despite the absence of constitutionally defined 
restrictions on the right, judges have qualified it particularly in the aftermath of 
the women‘s rights movement that led to the enactment of rape shielding laws. 
These laws give immunity for rape victims from being questioned about their 
prior sexual life during cross-examination and courts are consistent in upholding 
the validity of those laws.39 Other protection devices include pre-trial detention 
of the accused and other safety programs. In recent times, federal and state 
judges have increasingly granted requests for anonymity.40  
Anonymous informants are also allowed in so far as there is other evidence 
sufficient to prove the charge.  For example, in Romero v. State, a US court held 
that, confrontation can be restricted only to uphold ―an important public interest 
and when the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured‖.41 Here the 
important public interest is the safety of a witness.42 
In United States v. Jesus-Casteneda, the court of appeal came up with certain 
criteria to determine admissibility of evidence given in disguise with a witness 
wearing artificial mustache and wig. The court reasoned:  
Applying that rule here, the CI‘s [confidential informant] disguise in the 
form of a wig and mustache was necessary to further an important state 
                                           
36
 Nora Demleitner (1998) Witness Protection in Criminal Cases: Anonymity, Disguise or 
Other Options, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. Supp. p. 641.  
   <http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1271&context=wlufac > 
accessed 23 Sept 2017 
37
 USA and Ethiopia share the notion of constitutional supremacy which places their 
constitutions at the top of the legal hierarchy within the respective jurisdictions. 
38
 The Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution.  
39
 Demleitner, Witness Protection in Criminal Cases, supra note 36, pp. 641-645. 
40
 Ibid.  
41
 Emphasis added. Romero v. State (2013 discussed in ―Open Issue: The Constitutionality 
of Permitting Testimony by A Disguised Witness‖, Federal Evidence Review) 
<http://federalevidence.com/blog/2013/february/disguised-witness-and-confrontation-
clause> accessed 21 September 2017 
42
 Another exception is the case of child witnesses in view of their low level personal 
emotion. This was the holding of the supreme court in the case of Maryland v. Craig 
whereby the court decided to allow an alleged child victim ―to testify by one-way closed 
circuit television‖ as, the court added, face-to-face confrontation may cause "serious 
emotional distress for the child‖. Right to Confront Witness (Legal Information Institute) 
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/right_to_confront_witness> accessed 20 September 
2017 
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interest, namely a witness‘s safety. The government offered reasons for 
protecting the CI‘s identity, given his continuing involvement in Sinaloa 
Cartel drug investigations as an undercover agent. Second, the reliability of 
the CI‘s testimony was otherwise assured, because (1) he was physically 
present in the courtroom, (2) he testified under oath, thus impressing him 
with the seriousness of the matter and the possibility of penalty for perjury, 
(3) he was subject to cross-examination while Appellant could see him, (4) 
despite his disguise, the jury was able to hear his voice, see his entire face 
including his eyes and facial reactions to questions, and observe his body 
language. These are all key elements of one‘s demeanor that shed light on 
credibility. Thus, we hold that in this case, the disguise in the form of a wig 
and mustache did not violate the Confrontation Clause.43 
In Smith v Illinois,44 a key prosecution witness testified under a false name. 
The witness was cross-examined on his testimony, but the trial judge prevented 
the defense from ascertaining his true name and address. The Supreme Court 
reversed the conviction by a majority stating: 
In the present case, there was not, to be sure, a complete denial of all right of 
cross-examination. But the petitioner was denied the right to ask the principal 
prosecution witness either his name or where he lived… Yet when the 
credibility of a witness is in issue, the very starting point in ―exposing 
falsehood and bringing out the truth‖ through cross-examination must 
necessarily be to ask the witness who he is and where he lives. The witness‘ 
name and address open countless avenues of in-court examination and out-
of-court investigation. To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the 
threshold is to effectively emasculate the right of cross-examination itself. 
In R v Taylor (UK) the court held that ‗[t]he right of the accused to see and 
know the identity of his accusers should only be denied in rare and exceptional 
circumstances. Whether the exception was made out was pre-eminently a matter 
for the discretion of the court‖.45 The court proceeded to set out the following 
standards in exercising the discretion: 
1. There must be real grounds for fear of the consequences if the evidence 
were given and the identity of the witness was revealed. ... 
2. The evidence must be sufficiently relevant and important to make it 
unfair to make the Crown proceed without it. ... 
                                           
43
United States v. Jesus-Casteneda (summary of the court‘s ruling) 
<http://federalevidence.com/pdf/2013/01Jan/US.v.Jesus-Casteneda.pdf> accessed 7 
October 2017 
44
 Lusty, supra note 1, p. 379. 
45
 R v Taylor, cited in Id, p. 393. 
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3. The Crown must satisfy the court that the creditworthiness of the 
witness had been fully investigated and disclosed. 
4. The court must be satisfied that there would be no undue prejudice to the 
accused ... 
5. The court could balance the need for protection of the witness, including 
the extent of that protection, against unfairness or the appearance of 
unfairness.46 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) stated that before a suspect 
is convicted, he/she must, in principle, have an opportunity to challenge the 
truthfulness and reliability of a testimony.47 The Court has, however, 
acknowledged exceptions to the right of the defendant ―to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him‖.48 In Ludi v Switzerland,49 the same court overturned 
a criminal verdict ―based on a written statement by an undercover agent and a 
written transcription of telephone conversations with the defendant‖.  In this 
case, the accused had no opportunity to examine the state witness before or 
during the trial.   
But in Asch v Austria50, the ECtHR did not find violation of the Convention 
even though the court of first instance relied on evidence by a police officer and 
a physician who had examined the victim-witness, although the victim later 
refused to testify at the trial. Thus, the conviction handed down based on the 
pre-trial record was affirmed. Here the evidence from the investigating police 
officer and the physician corroborated the witness‘s pre-trial statement. In other 
words, the domestic court did not depend solely on the testimony of the victim-
witness.  
On the contrary, in P.S. v Germany,51 the domestic court, in finding the 
accused guilty, relied entirely on a statement of an eight-year-old girl who was 
allegedly sexually abused by her music teacher. The German court did not 
require the victim to testify at the trial so as to protect her personal development. 
The ECtHR considered the conviction as a breach of the suspect‘s right under 
the Convention since pre-trial statement of the witness became the sole and 
                                           
46
 Ibid.  
47
 Lorena Bachmaier Winter, ―Transnational Criminal Proceedings, Witness Evidence and 
Confrontation: Lessons from the ECtHR‘s Case Law‖, Utrecht Law Review 
<https://www.utrechtlawreview.org/articles/abstract/10.18352/ulr.246/> accessed 23 
September 2017 
48
 European Convention on Human Rights (1950), Art 6(3)(d).  
49
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decisive evidence in finding the accused guilty of the crime he was charged 
with.    
South Africa is said to have ―experienced one of the worst intimidations 
anywhere in the world‖52 during the apartheid era and the threat was directed 
against former ANC members who appeared in court to testify against their 
former freedom fighter colleagues. In 1985, the high court decided the case of S 
v Leepile in which the state demanded the withholding of the identity of its 
witnesses.  Rejecting the request, the judge noted:  
(a) No investigation could be conducted by the accused‘s legal 
representatives into the witness‘ background to ascertain whether he has a 
general reputation for untruthfulness, whether he has made previous 
inconsistent statements nor to investigate other matters which might be 
relevant to his credibility in general. (b) It would make it more difficult to 
make inquiries to establish that the witness was not at places on the occasions 
mentioned by him. (c) It would further heighten the witness‘ sense of 
impregnability and increase the temptation to falsify or exaggerate.53 
It is also worthy to note that intimidation often results from underlying social 
grievances. As South Africa‘s experience shows, prosecution witnesses under 
apartheid were frequently targeted because their participation as witnesses 
against their former colleagues was considered as betrayal of a just cause, 
collaboration with an unjust regime. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the ANC 
―openly called for the assassination of known informers and detailed brutal 
killings of former members who served as state witnesses, describing them as 
‗just reprisals‘.54 We also find a similar account that took place in Europe in the 
middle ages. Individuals who testified before the inquisition, considered earlier, 
became targets of violence because their action was deemed to have exposed 
fellow citizens to unjustified punishment.55 In short, the motive for revenge is 
much deeper than just hate to individual witnesses. 
In other jurisdictions, witnesses have encountered serious, and in some cases, 
life-threatening intimidation.56 The degree of risk also varies greatly.  
[The defense] will often attempt ‗to make witnesses appear so inconsistent, 
forgetful, muddled, spiteful, or greedy that their word cannot be safely 
believed. …  [I]t is of little surprise… witnesses frequently leave the witness 
                                           
52
 Lusty, supra note 1, p. 401.  
53
 Footnotes omitted. Id, p. 402. 
54
 Id, p. 401. 
55
 Id, p. 368.  
56
 Karen Kramer, Witness Protection as a Key Tool in Addressing Serious and Organized 
Crime <http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_GG4_Seminar/Fourth_GGSeminar_P3> 
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box ‗angrily and in tears‘. In addition, simply being in the witness box makes 
individuals vulnerable to verbal abuse and threats shouted from the public 
gallery or being stared at by the accused. Moreover, when trials end or 
adjourn, suspects, victims, and witnesses may all move out of the room into 
the public waiting areas of the court building where further intimidation 
occurs. 
Aside from organized and other serious offenses, most witnesses do not face 
serious risk to their lives. Rather they tend to experience “verbal threats, 
intimidation, harassment, assault, property damage or simply fear of reprisal as a 
result of their cooperation with‖57 law enforcement personnel.  
Progress has been made in recent times, mainly due to ―the increased impact 
of organized criminal and terrorist groups‖.58 On the global level, the UN 
General Assembly adopted a resolution which calls for the implementation of 
―measures to minimize inconvenience to victims, protect their privacy, when 
necessary, and ensure their safety, as well as that of their family and witnesses 
on their behalf, from intimidation and retaliation‖.59 As part of this global 
movement, Ethiopia has enacted legislation governing the protection of 
witnesses and whistleblowers discussed below. 
3. Ethiopia’s Legal Framework  
3.1 Right to Cross-Examination 
Under Art 20(4) of the Ethiopian Constitution, accused persons are entitled to 
have ―full access to any evidence presented against them, to examine witnesses 
testifying against them‖.60 The 1961 Criminal Procedure Code recognizes the 
same right in Art 136. However, the Code differs from the Constitution with 
respect to the scope of the right. The Code limits its scope ―to show to the court 
what is erroneous, doubtful or untrue in the answers given in examination-in-
chief‖61 (emphasis mine). In this regard, the Constitution is progressive in the 
sense that it stipulates a broader right to accused persons to have ―full access to 
any evidence presented against them, to examine witnesses testifying against 
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them‖ (emphasis mine). Put another way, ―full access to any evidence‖ seems to 
imply that the personality and credibility of the witness are also the subject of 
examination by the other side; the testifier and the testimony are inseparable. 
Furthermore, the reading of the foreign academic literature and foreign case law 
clearly reveals that the right of confrontation extends far beyond the testimony 
given in the courtroom). Confrontation offers the accused with the opportunity 
to discredit the witness‘s trustworthiness as well. 
A literal interpretation of Article 20(4) of the Constitution does not warrant 
any restriction on the right.62 However, as discussed before, an absolute cross-
examination right is problematic. In the words of Eva Brems, ―The priority of 
human rights that holds in principle does not hold in every concrete case.‖63 
Similarly, Daniel Betancourt observed that:  
To resolve whether anonymity should be allowed or not, first, we have to 
consider that law is not an exact science. In law, there are general rules, but 
always there are some exceptions. It is not possible to have only one formula 
and give the same interpretation to every case. For that reason, justice needs 
to adapt and the courts should interpret the legal bodies according to the 
specific case. Every rule has exceptions[sic], and without doubt anonymity as 
well.64 
In the Ethiopian legal system, the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (ATP) and 
the Proclamation on Protection of Witnesses and Whistleblowers (PWW) 
contain limitations on the exercise of cross-examination. This move by the 
federal legislature appears justified on pragmatic considerations—the interest of 
the public and of the individual witness. However, these laws contain substantial 
modification on the constitutional right.  
There are also other legal rules that conflict with Art 20(4) of Constitution.  
First, Articles 144 and 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) make out-of-
court testimony and expert opinion admissible as evidence in court.65 Art 144(1) 
reads, ―The deposition of a witness taken at a preliminary inquiry may be read 
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and put in evidence… where the witness is dead or insane, cannot be found, is 
so ill as not to be able to attend the trial or is absent‖ from the country. Although 
US courts permit the testimony of an absent witness,66 there is a clear 
divergence between the US and the Ethiopian laws. In Ethiopia, the accused 
cannot cross-examine the witness at the preliminary inquiry; he is a passive 
observer while the prosecutor and the judge are the main actors.67  
Second, the same argument can be made against Art 145 which reads, ―The 
deposition of an expert taken at a preliminary inquiry may be read and put in 
evidence… although he is not called as a witness.‖68 These provisions (i.e. 
Articles 144 and 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code) deny the suspect the 
chance to put questions to the public prosecutor‘s witnesses. They also fail to 
satisfy the requirement and purpose of oath in court which witnesses must 
invariably undertake before testifying. The administration of oath sends a 
message to the witness about the consequences of his word in a court of law and 
the sanction for perjury.69 So, Arts 144 and 145 of the CPC override the 
confrontation and oath requirements which are key reliability-ensuring 
mechanisms.  
Third, as per Article 137 of the CPC, testimony based on one‘s ―direct or 
indirect knowledge‖ is permissible as evidence in court. Again, this defeats the 
rationale for the confrontation right although foreign courts consider hearsay 
only under strict conditions.70 Hearsay evidence is given by a person who has no 
firsthand knowledge of the alleged act and is rather based on what one has heard 
others say. Such evidence is problematic as the witness is incapable of properly 
answering cross-examination questions.  
The constitutionality of the hearsay rule has never been tested in Ethiopia to 
date; now, it is also incorporated in the Anti-terrorism Proclamation of 2009. In 
regard to the position of foreign judges, in the US, it has been ruled that hearsay 
restricts or violates the confrontation rule71 but it can be lawful if two conditions 
are present: when the witness is unavailable and, during previous court 
proceedings such as a preliminary inquiry, he/she had testified against the same 
defendant and was subject to cross-examination by that defendant.72 Thus, there 
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are legal rules in Ethiopia that evoke concerns regarding their consistency with 
the constitutional and human right to confrontation.   
3.2 Protection of witnesses and whistleblowers 
Testimony is perhaps the most widely used prosecution evidence and, without it, 
the criminal justice system would be ineffective, particularly regarding serious 
crimes. Without witness protection, the government‘s ability to prosecute and 
ultimately safeguard the public from crime would significantly diminish. Those 
who witnessed the commission of a crime would be discouraged from reporting 
and testifying for fear of reprisal.  
The position of the witness raises both a legal and moral question. This can 
relate to a person who is trapped by the duty to testify, but not as a matter of 
personal choice in the case of serious crimes. Failing to do so amounts to 
―refusal to aid justice‖73 and is punishable criminally.   
While the right of the accused is unambiguously stated in the FDRE 
Constitution and ICCPR, no parallel safeguard exists for the witness. The right 
of the accused is given due attention in international and national laws. On the 
contrary, little attention is paid to the well-being of the witness who could be 
subject to harassment even at the risk of her life for cooperating with the 
prosecution. In terms of the law, the witness has been ‗the forgotten soul of the 
criminal justice system‘.  
Lawmakers have been dragging their feet to respond to this pressing social 
problem. Of course, there are some legal provisions here and there on the 
subject but they are far from sufficient. To start with the FDRE Constitution, Art 
20(1) refers to in camera proceedings with the view to ensure the privacy of 
parties, public moral and national security. Here the word parties, if interpreted 
literally, does not cover the witness. Thus, the personal safety of the witness has 
no constitutional basis for protection in Ethiopia.74  
Other piecemeal rules include a provision in the Criminal Procedure Code 
that requires judges to deny bail if the suspect ―is likely to interfere with 
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witnesses or tamper with the evidence‖.75 Once again, the concern here is not 
the witness‘s security rather the preservation and integrity of his/her testimonial 
evidence. If the safety of the witness is protected as a result of the denial of bail, 
it is incidental. If there is any specific rule on the subject, it is only Article 444 
of the Criminal Code which makes it a crime to assault, suppresses or harm 
“any person who gives information or evidence to justice authorities or is a 
witness in criminal cases”.76  
The only law that provides a comprehensive coverage on witness safety 
measures and programs in this regard is the Protection of Witnesses and 
Whistleblowers of Criminal Offences Proclamation (PWW), i.e. Proclamation 
No. 699/2010. It  has been enacted ―to protect witnesses and whistleblowers of a 
criminal offense from direct or indirect danger and attack they may face as a 
consequence thereof and thereby to ensure their safety‖.77 This legislation 
applies to all crimes punishable with rigorous imprisonment for ten years or 
more (regardless of the minimum prison term threshold) or with capital 
punishment.78 The Proclamation puts preconditions before anonymity is granted. 
The conditions are, first, the offence must be such that it cannot be proved by a 
means other than the testimony of the witness or information from the 
whistleblower requiring protection and, second, there is reason to believe that a 
threat of serious danger exists to the life, physical security, freedom or property 
of the witness or his family. 
Art 4(1) of the Proclamation provides details regarding the measures and 
programs applicable, severally or jointly, including the following: physical 
protection of person, residence and property of the witness; relocation at the 
expense of the state, change of identity, provision of self-defense weapon, 
immunity from prosecution for an offence for which he provides information, 
free medical service in public health institutions, counseling and opportunity for 
employment and education, covering cost of living in case of loss of capacity to 
work as a result of reprisal. Most of these programs may not affect the right of 
the defense to fair trial. As pointed out by Kramer, the purpose of protection 
―should never provide a motivation to testify but merely remove or counter the 
witness‘ view that he or she is in danger if he/she cooperates.‖79 Indeed, witness 
protection should not create an incentive to testify because that would lead to a 
potential conflict of interests.   
                                           
75
 Criminal Procedure Code, supra note 61, Art 67(c).  
76
 Criminal Code of Ethiopia (2005), Art 444.  
77
 Protection of Witnesses and Whistleblowers of Criminal Offences, Proclamation 
No.699/2010, Paragraph 3 of the Preamble.   
78
 Id, Art 3(1).  
79
 Kramer, supra note 56, p. 5. 
320                              MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 12, No.2                             December 2018 
 
 
There are other provisions of the Proclamation that restrict or deny fair trial. 
The list of such legal rules affecting the accused‘ right includes changing 
identity of witness, the prohibition against the accused to contact the witness, 
taking testimony in camera and behind screen and providing evidence via 
electronic devices.80 In the face of such measures, it would be difficult, or even 
impossible, to expose contradictions, lies and prejudices thereby significantly 
reducing the chances of the defense to refute the charges against him. What if 
the witness is a false witness? What if the witness has some motive to falsely 
incriminate the suspect? How can the defense challenge the untrustworthiness of 
a witness by exposing, for example, his prior criminal record for perjury, 
misrepresentation or forgery? Should someone spend the rest of her life behind 
bar or lose her life because of false accusations? There is thus the need for 
safeguards against such risks, and cross-examination contributes toward fair trial 
thereby serving as one of the prevention schemes against of unwarranted 
convictions. 
As the American Supreme Court once stated, confrontation is meant to 
prevent conviction ―based on the charges of unseen and unknown –and hence 
unchallengeable individuals.‖81 The way the witness reacts to questions has 
evidentiary value; it is also part of the broader notion of fair trial. The demeanor 
of the witness, the manner of her testimony, the behavior she manifests while in 
the witness box, whether the witness is cooperative, evasive or nervous when 
answering questions, the character and personal impression she creates, her 
physical and emotional reaction can be indicative of the veracity of the oral 
evidence. 
In addition to the Witness Protection Proclamation, we should add the Anti-
terrorism law which authorizes the removal of witness information from court 
records (including the publication and dissemination of such information)82 and 
the admissibility of intelligence report involving terror (even if such report does 
not mention the source or method of information gathering)83 and hearsay 
evidence,84 digital or electronic evidence,85 evidence gathered through 
surveillance, information obtained through interception by foreign law 
enforcement bodies,86 a written confession and voice and video recording.87 The 
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law does not provide guidance on how to weigh the probative value of these 
evidences and whether they are sufficient to make a case against the suspect.  
As for intelligence report, the high court of New Zealand rejected a request 
by the prosecutor to withhold names of undercover agents saying that the 
officers were of the highest integrity and, if their identity were to be revealed, 
they would not testify. The judge reasoned that:  
I cannot agree with the submission. The real risk of prejudice to the defense 
and of' conviction of the innocent would remain. A private assessment by the 
prosecution of the credibility of a police officer is no substitute in the 
interests of' justice for a proper check of his background by the accused 
whose liberty is at stake and who stands condemned on the undercover 
officer‘s evidence if his credibility is unchallenged... Unless and until the 
defense ascertains the officer's name his background cannot be adequately 
checked in order to see whether there is justification for attacking his 
credibility.88 
Both Proclamation 652/2009 and Proclamation 699/2010 are silent as to 
whether hearsay and intelligence reports are to be used as corroborative or 
conclusive evidence. In the case of US case law, the non-disclosure of part or all 
information about a witness is permitted but it has to be corroborated by other 
evidence.89 For both American courts and ECtHR, witness anonymity is 
tolerated only in exceptional circumstances and, when allowed, the testimony is 
insufficient for conviction. Only time will tell how Ethiopian judges will 
interpret the law but parliament has failed to stress the place of cross-
examination, as a fundamental right, in deciding demands for anonymous 
testimony.  
The two proclamations vary concerning who decides on the issue of witness 
protection measures. Art Anti-Terrorism Proclamation allows witness protection 
―where the court, on its own motion or on an application made by the public 
prosecutor or by the witness, is satisfied that the life of such witness is in 
danger…‖90Accordingly, the power to allow or disallow an application rests 
with the court but Proclamation 699/2010 confers this power on the Ministry of 
Justice (currently the Federal Attorney General) and the Federal Ethics and 
Anti-corruption Commission the decision of which is not appealable.91 It 
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follows that Proclamation 699/2010 has impliedly repealed the power of courts 
under Proclamation 652/2009.  
This line of interpretation is further strengthened by the explicit reference to 
the Federal High Court which is empowered to approve protection agreements 
made by the Federal Attorney General with child witnesses. As far as adults are 
concerned, the responsibility is entrusted to the Ministry of Justice (currently the 
Federal Attorney General) and Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission.92 This 
shows usurpation of judicial power by the legislature in favor of the executive.  
In contrast to the Ethiopian law, a US judge remarked that ―the State or the 
witness should at the very least come forward with some showing of why the 
witness must be excused from answering the question. The trial judge can then 
ascertain the interest of the defendant in the answer and exercise an informed 
discretion in making his ruling.‖93 It is a matter of conventional wisdom that 
judges, if allowed to operate independently, become the custodian of human 
rights. The transfer of court power to the executive should be, therefore, a matter 
of grave concern.  
4. CCI’s Decision  in the Case of MehadiAley and others 
The case of MehadiAley and others involves a constitutional complaint by three 
persons accused of committing terror offences.94 During the hearing, they 
objected to the withholding of names and addresses of witnesses based on Art 
32 of Proclamation 652/2009 which bestows power upon judges to allow 
anonymous applications. The defense argued that the failure to disclose witness 
identity by the prosecutor violated Art 20(4) of the Constitution. The defense 
also mentioned the absence of limit to the confrontation provision under the 
Constitution and demanded the advance disclosure of state witnesses so that 
they could prepare for the trial. They argued that their prior knowledge of the 
witnesses was crucial for the preparation of the defense and, ultimately, the 
fairness of the trial and the search for the truth. Consequently, the court referred 
the issue to the CCI for a constitutional ruling on the validity of Art 32(b) and 
Art 4 (1)(h)(j) of Proclamations 652/2009 and 699/2010, respectively. 
After considering the petition, the CCI reasoned that: 
―what can be understood from this provision [i.e. Art 20(4)] is that it affirms 
the right of accused persons to cross-examination but the defense has no right 
for the disclosure of names and addresses of witnesses. Nor does the 
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Constitution impose the duty on the prosecution to disclose such information. 
This is categorically expressed in the Constitution…‖  
The Council, in an apparent attempt to establish the intent of the framers of 
the Constitution, noted that ―the reason for not including a requirement for 
disclosure in the Constitution is that it would pose danger to the safety of 
witnesses rather than ensuring the fairness of the trial.‖ This conclusion is rather 
unwarranted and expansive in view of the fact that constitutions do not deal with 
such detailed matters. In the end, the CCI did not find inconsistency between the 
Constitution and the proclamations.95 Consequently, it ruled the proclamations 
were constitutionally valid. 
Contrary to this, Lusty, while commenting on the US case law, noted that 
―the right of an accused to know the true identity of his or her accusers lies at 
the heart of the right of confrontation.‖96 Again, in Barnard v Williams, a New 
Zealand judge held, ―[t]he name could well lead to a line of inquiry that will 
throw doubt on or even destroy the value of testimony... to suppress identity is 
to change the character of the proceedings and ignore what I believe is a basic 
principle‖97 in a court trial. Examples of judicial decisions from other 
jurisdictions are not of course directly applicable to our legal system. Yet, we 
can make reference to a principle (that is also recognized under our 
Constitution) which is in tandem with such rulings upheld by courts of other 
countries.   
The Council of Constitutional Inquiry should have clearly spelled out the 
absence of any constitutional limit to face-to-face examination. It would make 
sense if it tried to justify the contested laws based on pragmatic considerations 
using teleological reasoning. The Council rather offered a remote and 
unwarranted opinion to conclude that the Constitution anticipated the 
withholding of witness identity. Furthermore, the CCI has failed to properly 
articulate the importance of the fundamental human right to cross-examination, 
and the reasoning fails to appreciate the significance of fundamental rights. 
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The right of cross-examination is key feature of fair trial. From the perspective 
of the accused, it is an opportunity to challenge the credibility of witnesses 
testifying against him/her. Apart from face-face encounter in the courtroom, a 
meaningful cross-examination depends on before-trial knowledge of the 
witness‘ personal background whether, for example, he had prior conviction for 
perjury or misrepresentation. Prior knowledge creates avenues to discredit the 
testimony.  
Thus, it comes as no surprise that cross-examination is recognized both in the 
domestic law of Ethiopia and international human rights law. On the other hand, 
witnesses may face harassment and life-threatening situations if their identity is 
disclosed to the defense. This has necessitated the protection of their safety 
without which the effectiveness of the criminal justice system would be in 
jeopardy for fear of reprisal.   
The federal legislature has passed laws that embody witness protection 
measures and programs including concealment or change of witness identity. 
While the need to have witness protection laws is understandable and long 
overdue, care must be taken during application so as not to stretch them to the 
extent of jeopardizing the success of the defense and the fairness of the trial. 
The withholding of witness information can significantly diminish the ability of 
the accused to show the unreliability of the testimony of a state witness.  
In Mehadi Aley and others, the CCI has not properly scrutinized the 
existence of specific factual and legal grounds justifying the suppression of 
identity of state witnesses. The decision was also reached without balancing the 
constitutionally guaranteed human right of the defense to cross-examination. 
Moreover, the CCI has indeed failed to give sufficient reasoning to support the 
holding.                                                                                                                 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
